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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plain tiff-Respondent, 
vs. 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ST A TEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, Lanson Roy Pratt, was convicted 
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-80 (Supp. 1969), 
before the Juvenile Court in and for Davis County, 
Honorable L. Roland Anderson, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried by the court, sitting 
without a jury, and was found guilty of causing 
Nelda Pratt, a minor to pose nude in a lewd and 
suggestive manner for photographic pictures, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-80 (Supp. 1969), 
i.e., contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the decision of the 
Juvenile Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent does not agree with the statement 
of facts set forth in Appellant's Brief, and therefore 
sets forth its own statement as follows: 
On August 1, 1969, Nelda Pratt, a minor, Roy 
and Lavonne Pratt, and Harold Zesiger were at the 
home of Roy and Lavonne Pratt in Woods Cross (T. 
3, 4, 10). Lavonne suggested Roy go in to Salt Lake 
to get some alcoholic beverages (T. 4, 11). Where-
upon Roy and Harold rode into town and purchased 
some Cherry Sloe Gin (T. 4, 11). 
After returning to Woods Cross with the alco-
holic beverages, mixed drinks of 7-up and Cherry 
Sloe Gin were served to Roy, Lavonne, Harold and 
Nelda (T. 12). Later, Lavonne suggested that Nelda 
pose in the nude so that photographic pictures 
could be taken of her (T. 5). Arrangements were 
then made to take the pictures. Lavonne got a sheet 
for a backdrop (T. 6). Harold took eight pictures with 
his polaroid camera of Nelda posing in the nude, in 
a lewd suggestive manner (T. 12; Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, 
6, 7). Roy assisted by holding the light (T. 6, 13). Mr. 
Pratt received four of the pictures and Harold 
Zesiger took the other four (T. 14). 
At the trial Nelda Pratt testified that: Roy and 
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Harold went to town "to get the booze" (T. 4), that 
there were two men, Lavonne and myself present 
(T. 6), that Harold was taking the pictures IT. 6), and 
that a man who looked like Roy was holding the 
lights (T. 6). Mr. Harold Zesiger testified to almost 
exactly the same facts, except that he was sure Roy 
Pratt was present and held the light (T. 13). 
The appellant took the stand in his own defense 
and testified that he was working from 4:00 p.m. on 
August 1, 1969, to 2:00 a.m. the next morning (T. 20), 
that upon coming home, he held the lamp on Nelda's 
nude figure only briefly, and then retired to bed 
(T. 20). Others testified for the appellant supporting 




THE COURTS HAVE HELD A STATUTE VALID 
UNDER THE VAGUENESS ISSUE, IF THE PERSON 
WHO VIOLATED THE STATUTE KNEW OR SHOULD 
HAVE KNOWN UNDER THE STATUTE THAT HE WAS 
COMMITTING A CRIME. 
The appellant is appealing this case partly on 
the basis that "Utah Code Ann. (1953) (sic) 55-10-80 
is unconstitutional in that it is vague and indefinite." 
(Appellant's brief pg. 4). Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 
1969) § 55-10-80 reads in part as follows: 
"Any person eighteen years of age or over 
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who induces, aids, or encourages a child to vio-
late any federal, state, or local law or muni-
cipal ordinance, or who tends to cause children 
to become or remain delinquent, or who aids, 
contributes to, or become responsible for the 
neglect or delinquency of any child. . . . Any 
person who commits any act described above 
in this section, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor 
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the 
county jail not exceeding six months or by a 
fine not exceeding $299, or by both." 
Counsel for appellant states that the term "de-
linquency" is not specific enough to warn appel-
lant that he was committing a crime. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that 
a statute must be specific enough to warn the av-
erage person of the crime dealt with in the statute 
-holding that a person cannot be held guilty for 
violating a statute that he could not understand. In 
Connally v. General Construction Co., 296 U.S. 386 
(1926), the Supreme Court enforced this principle by 
holding that: 
"The test is whether the language conveys 
sufficient definite warning as to the prescribed 
conduct when measured by common under-
standing and practice." Id. at 391 (Emphasis 
added.) 
Later in Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) the 
Court held: 
"The essential purpose of the 'void for 
Vagueness' doctrine is to warn individuals of the 
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criminal consequences of their conduct." Id. at 
341. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the test handed down by the Supreme Court 
is whether or not a statute is sufficient to warn or 
give notice to an individual that he is committing 
a crime. This test is not applied on a broad scale 
to everyone who falls under the statute, but the 
statute is applied specifically to each individual to 
see if that individual knew or should have known 
that his actions would constitute a crime. As stated 
in U nUed States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29 ( 1962}: 
"We therefore consider the vagueness at-
tack solely in relation to whether the statute 
sufficiently warned National Dairy (Defend-
ant) .. . "Id. at 33. 
Applying the test or precedent established by the 
Supreme Court to the present situation, the appel-
lant has to prove that Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-80 
(Supp. 1969) was so vague that it could not warn 
Pratt that he was committing a crime. Considering 
what Pratt did in relation to the statute which he 
claims is vague leads to a ridiculous conclusion. Pratt 
and others had a young 17 year old girl strip down 
and pose for nude photographic pictures in a lewd 
and suggestive way and now claims that the word 
"delinquent" in the statute was not precise enough 
to tell him that his actions were a crime! Anyone 
with a little intelligence or understanding should 
conclude that having a minor pose nude in a sug-
gestive way would contribute to her delinquency. 
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If common intelligence is not enough, and if 
appellant feels that he did not have the understand-
ing or common sense to realize that taking nude 
photographs of a minor was a crime, then the Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled and determined exactly 
how vague the words "delinquent" and "contribut-
ing to the delinquency of a minor are." State v. Tritt, 
23 Utah 365, 463 P.2d 806 (1970), had exactly the 
same issue presented as appellant contends in his 
brief-that the word "delinquent" and "contributing 
to the delinquency" were vague and therefore un-
constitutional. This Court held: 
"Terms 'delinquent' and 'contributing to 
the delinquency' as used in the statute describ-
ing offense of contributing to delinquency of 
minor [U.C.A. § 55-10-80 Supp. 1969], bore 
connotations sufficiently well known that per-
sons of ordinary intelligence and judgment 
would have no difficulty in governing their 
conduct by the statute." Id. at 369. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has 
specifically held that the terms alleged by appellant 
are not vague or indefinite but rather precise and 
definite so that persons of ordinary intelligence 
would have no difficulty in governing their conduct 
by the statute. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING OF GUILT IS 
SUPPORTED BY THE ACCOMPLICE'S TESTIMONY 
AND IS CORROBORATED BY OTHER INDEPENDENT 
EVIDENCE. 
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The second point raised by appellant is that 
there is no evidence connecting him with the crime, 
other than an accomplice's statement. Appellant 
contends that under Utah Code Ann.§ 77-31-18 (1953) 
one cannot be convicted on testimony of an accom-
plice unless it is corroborated by other evidence. 
Section 77-31-18 of the Utah Code Ann. (1953) 
reads: 
"A conviction shall not be had on the testi-
mony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborat-
ed by other evidence, which in itself and 
without the aid of the testimony of the ac-
complice tends to connect the defendant with 
the commission of the offense; and the corrob-
oration shall not be sufficient, if it merely 
shows the commission of the offense or the 
circumstances thereof." 
In order to help interpret this statute, Utah 
courts have adopted a test determining the amount 
and type of corroborative evidence necessary, 
combined with an accomplice's testimony, to con-
vict a person. In State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 
P.2d 465 (1964) this court held: 
"Test of corroboration of accomplice is 
whether there is evidence, independent of ac-
complice's testimony, which jury could reason-
ably believe tends to implicate and connect the 
defendant with the commission of the crime." 
Id. at 468. (Emphasis added.) 
See also: State 1'. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 236 P.2d 1077 
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(1951), State Ii. Virgil, 123 Utah 495, 260 P.2d 539 (1953), 
and State v. Bruner, 106 Utah 49, 145 P.2d 302 (1949). 
Note that the test is not one which implicates or 
connects the person to the crime, but evidence that 
tends to connect or implicate the accused to the 
crime. 
There are several things which tend to con-
nect Pratt with the crime: (1) Pratt had in his house 
one half of the nude pictures of Nelda just as 
Harold Zesiger testified (i.e., they divided the pic-
tures in half, Pratt keeping four and Zesiger keep-
ing four (T. 14)). (2) Nelda testified there were two 
men in the room besides Lavonne and herself (T. 37). 
(3) Nelda testified that she heard a voice that 
sounded like Pratt's (T. 41). (4) Officer Leishman 
stated on the stand that Nelda signed a statement 
and also told him that Roy was there while the pic-
ures were being taken (T. 50). The foregoing is all 
independent evidence, and does not include evi-
dence by Harold Zesiger, an accomplice who had 
all ready been sentenced. Mr. Zesiger gave a full 
account of that night's activities, including Pratt's 
participation. 
The independent evidence must tend to con-
nect or implicate the accused with the crime. Each 
of the above facts does more than tend to implicate 
Pratt-they along with Mr. Zesiger' s testimony prove 
that Lanson Roy Pratt is guilty of contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor under Utah Code Ann. § 55-
10-80 (Supp. 1969). There were only four people pre-
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sent the night the obscene pictures were taken. One 
was the accused, and only two of the other three testi-
fied. Both of these persons indicated in one form or 
another that Pratt was present. 
Nelda Pratt's testimony is not congruent, in 
several spots she contradicts herself and takes dif-
ferent positions. The last day in court Nelda testifies 
almost opposite as to what she testified to on the 
first day in court. The court, in order to get an ac-
curate and true understanding, should take into 
consideration that the accused was Nelda's step-
brother. Notice what Nelda Pratt told the investigat-
ing officer: 
QUESTION: Alright, and did she (Nelda 
Pratt) ever say with absolute 
certainty that Roy was even 
there? 
ANSWER: Yes sir. 
QUESTION: Did she, or did she state as she 
did, has here that I thought he 
was but I'm not sure. 
ANSWER: No, to both Chief Niles and 
myself she stated directly that 
he had been present in the room 
and then again upon my ap-
proaching her for a signed state-
ment she made a statement that 
he had been there. 
(T. 50) 
It is obvious that Nelda Pratt knew and was 
aware that the accused was present when the lewd 
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photographs were taken, but she wanted to protect 
her step-brother. In Aagard v. Dayton and Miller Rcd-E-Mix 
Concrete Co., 12 Utah 2d 34, 361 P.2d 522 (1961), this 
Court held: 
"A witness' interest may be considered as 
grounds for refusing to accept his testimony, 
even though he is not a party." Id. at 36. 
Judge Anderson, of the juvenile court, without 
a jury present, listened to all witnesses and con-
cluded as this court did in Sch/utter v. McCarthy, 113 
Utah 543, 196 P.2d 968 (1948) when they said: "Where 
plaintiff's witness and defendant's witness gave 
conflicting testimony, jury was entitled to believe 
testimony of plaintiff's witness." Id. at 550. 
The testimony of others who were present that 
night, plus the fact that Pratt had one-half of the 
pictures taken, is sufficient evidence under Utah 
Court precedence to convict Pratt of contributing to 
the delinquency of a minor. Zesiger testified that 
Pratt received four of the eight photographs. 
QUESTION: Who had the pictures after they 
were taken, who kept them? 
ANSWER: Roy had four and I had four. 
(T. 14) 
Later Police Officers got the obscene photo-
graphs of Nelda from Harold Zesiger and Roy Pratt 
(T. 30, 14). Why would Pratt keep the photographs 
for weeks before reporting the crime? Pratt claims 
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that he found them on the refrigerator. Respondent 
contends that it is too much of a coincident for Roy 
Pratt to have four of the photographs and Harold 
Zesiger to have four. Rather, the incident occurred 
just as Zesiger related it-he gave four to Roy and 
kept four for himself. 
Appellant puts great stress on the fact that the 
evidence, other than the accomplices testimony, is 
weak. It is a well settled rule of law that corrobora-
tive evidence need not be strong. In State v. Jones, 
95 Mont. 317, 26 P.2d 341 (1933), the Montana Su-
preme Court observed: 
"The corroboratory evidence need not be 
strong, if as a matter of law it satisfies the re-
quirements of the statute (People v. Barker, 
114 Cal. 617, 46 P. 601), and in passing upon 
the weight to be given to corroboratory evi-
dence, the jurors are at liberty to disregard 
or disbelieve the explanation of facts and cir-
cumstances as given by the defendant and his 
witnesses." 
All the corroborative evidence need do is tend to 
connect the accused with the crime. There is no 
court precedent or rule of law which states the cor-
roborative has to be strong. In State v. Spencer, 15 Utah 
149, 49 Pac. 302 (1897), the court interpreted Comp. 
Laws of Utah § 5049 (1888) which was the predeces-
sor of§ 77-31-18 (1953) Utah Code Ann. 
" ... and the corroborating evidence must 
of itself, and without the aid of the testimony 
of the accomplice, tend in some degree to con-
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nect the defendant with the commission of the 
offense. It need not be sufficient of itself to 
establish defendant's guilt, but it must tend in 
some degree to implicate and connect the de-
fendant with the commission of the offense 
charged. This evidence may be slight, yet the 
requirements of the statute are fulfilled if it be 
corroborating evidence." Id. at 150. 
Independent evidence consisting of photo-
graphs and testimony of others present to the effect 
that Roy was there, more than connects Pratt to the 
crime. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits that the 
conviction should be affirmed. Pratt had a fair and 
impartial hearing at which the judge found him 
guilty. The accomplice's testimony plus other in-
dependent evidence supports the finding that ap-
pellant, Mr. Pratt, is guilty. Based on the cases cited 
and the reasoning herein, the lower court convic-
tion of contributing to the delinquency of a minor 
should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Att-0mey 
General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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